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History textbooks tell us that the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies were the Age of Royal Absolutism. France under Louis XIV be-
came the model for monarchies across Europe. Nations initially
adopted this form of absolutism in a rather autocratic way, but later
in a more enlightened sense, as in Frederick I1'S Prussia or joseph I1'S
Austria. Absolutism was, for example, sometimes even installed by
official royal edict, as was the case with the Danish kongelov. Al-
though recent scholarship has suggested that absolutism in general
had more trouble unifying the political realm than has often been as-
sumed, it was, nonetheless, a major step towards the formation of the
'modern state' in Europe. I However, the monarchical model did not
prevail everywhere. The confrontation with absolutism and the
recognition of its challenges led to an obvious clash between monar-
chies and republics in both political theory and political practice.
The European free-states developed a decidedly antimonarchist sen-
timent, which was directed against the arrogance and expansionism
of the monarchs. However, many republicans did admire the monar-
chies because as unified states they managed to monopolise political
power, exploit the resources of the country, and achieve military effi-
ciency more effectively.
Nonetheless, the republics of Europe went their own ways for a va-
riety of reasons. Textbooks have long ignored these historical 'anom-
alies'. After the Italian Renaissance, republics make only brief ap-
pearances during the period of the English Civil War and Dutch
Golden Age, with the latter usually considered an exception to the
general European pattern." In a nutshell, the problem was that, al-
though most republics were successful in terms of political stability
Broadly speaking, these pairs of characteristics suggest that dynastic
states tended to have economies dominated by agriculture, the elites
were rural (nobility) rather than urban (bourgeoisie) and they were
better at waging war than doing business - an activity that they asso-
ciated with social declassification. The list also suggests that dynas-
and economic prosperity, their political systems and their societies
did not conform to the dominant model of centralised monarchy.
But the republic has made a spectacular comeback, as the concept
of 'republicanism' has been rediscovered by historians of political
thought as a major aspect of Europe's intellectual heritage) In gen-
eral, comparative methodologies have forced historians to rethink
their evaluations of various historical trajectories. More specifically,
recent studies of European state formation have emphasised the di-
versity of this process and the variety of societal models, especially in
the era preceding the French Revolution.s This book is part of this re-
publican revival, but seeks to explore beyond the mere notion of re-
public, by also investigating the practicalities of two early modern re-
publics, as well as their (self-)images. When we start to consider the
early modern republic as practice, and not just an idea, several con-
trasts with the monarchical system come to mind.' These contrasts
are more distinct in the case of large federal republics like the United
Provinces [the Netherlands] and the Swiss Confederation. Many of
the distinctions are also typical for the Italian city-states (Venice,
Genoa, Lucca, San Marino). In general, these contrasts can be sum-
marised in the following way:"
Polyarchic via co-optation Monarchic with hereditary succession
International trade Regional trade
Manufacturing Agriculture
Coexistence Uniformity
Bourgeoisie Aristocracy
Economic enterprise Warfare
Competitive exchange Regulation and coercion
Networks Territories
Militia, mercenary Standing professional
Discontinuous (poles) Continuous
Collaboration Domination
Local and urban Central (court)
Social Sectors
Government
Commerce
Production
Religion
Elites
Basis of social power
Mode
Theatre of operations
Army
Spatial dimension
Interrelations
Political and legal
consolidation
Republics Dynastic states
tic states did their business via regulation rather than competition,
that they were more at home in their territories than in networks,
hence in a continuous rather than fragmented geographical situa-
tion. That was one reason for religious unity, while federations of rel-
atively small autonomous territories and urban centres of compara-
ble size favoured religious variety and more generally political frag-
mentation and competition. Or, to look at it from the republican per-
spective, republics -respecially if they were federate - were forced to
find shared solutions for structural and political problems and were
thus compelled to collaborate, whereas dynastic (and Absolutist)
states could dominate. The republics used local and regional authori-
ties as the foundation for their government, while the dynastic states
were much more centralised.
All of this is, quite obviously, a gross simplification of the diversity
that was so characteristic of early modern Europe. This becomes im-
mediately clear when we take a closer look at republics, and especial-
ly the Swiss Confederation and the Dutch Republic. In actual fact,
the Swiss were probably more rural (or less urban) than the ideal type
would suggest, whilst the Dutch were more territorial than the model
allows for. Nonetheless, an argument can be made for including the
two as sub-types of the republican model. Moreover, that model
combines two distinct types of polities. On the one hand, we have the
city-state, of which Venice was probably the most prominent exam-
ple, if only because it survived the post-Renaissance period more suc-
cessfully than most other (Italian) city-states.7 On the other hand, we
have the confederate republics, which were composed of more or less
independent regions and towns. In Switzerland and the Netherlands,
the problem was further complicated by the fact that many of the
composite elements of these two republics were in a way autonomous
republics in their own right. As John de Witt, the Grand Pensionary
of Holland and the Dutch Republic's political leader during the
1650S and 1660s wrote in 1652:8
These provinces do not only constitute a republic,but each
province alone is a sovereign republic,and as such, these Unit-
ed Provinces should not bear the name of republic (in the sin-
gular) but rather the name of federated or united republics,
in the plural.
In the same vein, Franz Michael Biieler from Schwyz, the first Swiss
to write something resembling a Swiss public law, maintained in
1689 that the thirteen cantons of the Confederation were all together
and each in their own right a free, sovereign, independent state
(Stand).9
This book then is concerned with a specific type of republic. The
contributors investigate the similarities - often already recognised by
contemporaries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries - and the
differences between the Swiss and Dutch confederations from a vari-
ety of angles, as well as their interactions during these centuries. The
book is therefore also an exercise in comparative history, a type of
historical analysis that is perhaps more popular among sociologists
than among historians. IQ Even though many historians subscribe to
the necessity of comparison, they are sometimes put off by sociolo-
gy's insistence on model-building and reductionism, which is neces-
sary to fit the complexities of history into those models. IX As it is,
comparisons themselves come in different varieties. 12 The aim of the
present book is to investigate the structural aspects of the two early
modern republics: their constitution and political cohesion, their re-
ligions and forms of confessional coexistence, their political ideas
and identities, their art and representation, their commerce and
trade, and eventually their need to reform and improve in the later
eighteenth century. Many of the contributions also refer directly to
exchanges and inspirations between the Swiss and the Dutch. The
purpose of this introduction is to outline the inquiries that are pur-
sued in greater detail in the contributions that follow.
PART I As John Pocock indicated more than thirty years ago, the
fundamental problem of the republican form of government, at least
theoretically, was its instability. Whereas a monarchy was a univer-
sal principle, the republic was temporally defined and thus exposed
to circumstance and fate (fortuna), which rendered it unstable. 13 In a
world governed by the God Almighty, dynastic succession by divine
right was not only the rule, but also meant that it was the legitimate
form of government. On a more practical level, constant warfare was
the motor of early modern state building and depended on develop-
ing resources, which were best accumulated in a centralised 'coer-
cion-extraction-cycle'; and as the king was the commander-in-chief
during wartime, political and military structures were best suited to
a monarchy. How could (town) councils with their inevitably long
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and drawn-out procedures and dissenting opinions maintain an effi-
cient army? The fact that the Swiss were not involved in any major
war between 1515 and 1798 (two years that bookend two crushing
defeats) goes a long way toward explaining why they never saw the
need for a monocratic military leader like the Dutch stadholder. The
Dutch urban elite managed to do without him only when there was
no looming war on land (maritime wars depended on a naval fleet
funded and led by wealthy merchants) and called upon him in times
of external conflict as urgently as they tried to weaken his domestic
position during times of peace.
Contemporary observers in the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies could be forgiven a degree of scepticism, when they judged the
lack of political and military efficiency of the republics. Republics
were considered slow and indecisive. But the Dutch Republic and the
Swiss Confederation each experienced their own specific problems in
trying to stabilise their political systems. Andreas Wiirgler, in his
contribution to this book, deconstructs this problem into two sepa-
rate challenges: complexity and diversity. Wiirgler defines 'complexi-
ty' as the variety of ways in which the component parts were inter-
twined into the Swiss Confederation, which consisted of the original
eight fourteenth-century cantons, plus five cantons added in circa
1500, and the condominiums ruled by various combinations of can-
tons, and finally, there were the allied cantons. A similar complexity
existed in the Dutch Republic, where sparsely populated Drenthe
was acknowledged as a full province, for instance. But, nonetheless,
it was denied a seat in the States General. The so-called 'generality
lands' along the southern borders were ruled as condominiums by the
States General in the name of the sovereign provinces, and a substan-
tial number of sovereign pockets dotted the constitutional landscape.
Amsterdam alone contributed about one quarter of all Dutch taxes,
but in the States of Holland it had just one of 18 seats. In terms of
complexity, the Swiss, however, faced greater challenges than the
Dutch, because they had no central administrative institution what-
soever other than the fairly powerless Diet.
Besidesthis complexity, the two republics also had to deal with the
problem of diversity. As Wiirgler points out, each member of the
Confederation had its own privileges and customs, its own political
structures and traditions, its own religious confession. The mere fact
that they were united as one state did not help much to mitigate this
diversity. The very first article in the Union of Utrecht in 1579, notes
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PART Il A major threat to domestic stability in early modern Euro-
pean states was the issue of religious diversity. A long history of civil
wars in which religion was usually the main cause, or at least one of
the contributing factors, testifies to its role in undermining the stabil-
ity of the political order. Given that republics were potentially unsta-
ble regimes and given the many citizens who had their say in (church)
politics, it is easy to see that republics were potentially susceptible to
the turbulence caused by religious diversity. Thus they had to think
hard about how to resolve the issues surrounding religious plurifor-
mity. The chapters three and four by Loetz and Frijhoff discuss two
distinct solutions to this challenge. As Francisca Loetz describes it,
the solution the Swiss elite became resigned to was to divide the reli-
gious communities into territories with their own state churches.
Thus, some cantons remained Catholic, whilst others became Re-
formed. These territorial principles were laid down by the Peace of
Kappel in 1531, the first pragmatic and diplomatic solution to con-
fessional strife in Europe which could eventually serve as a model for
the more famous German Peace of Augsburg in 1555. Mutual recog-
nition and political collaboration on non-religious issues was thus
that the Dutch 'provinces will form an alliance, confederation, and
union among themselves ... in order to remain joined together for all
time, in every form and manner, as if they constituted only one
province', but at the same time, 'each province and the individual
cities, members and inhabitants thereof shall each retain undimin-
ished its special and particular privileges, franchises, exemptions'. I4
Although the Swiss had no equivalent written constitutional article,
they adhered to the very same practice, i.e., diversity was permitted
unopposed. One suspects that this was one of the major attractions
of the Confederation. Wiirgler's chapter one, as well as chapter two
by Maarten Prak, discuss the various strategies employed by Swiss
and Dutch authorities to cope with these challenges. They both point
out a number of instruments employed by the two states, most no-
tably the participation of representative institutions and citizens on
various levels of the state. Scholars are becoming increasingly con-
vinced that citizenship - which implies some kind of political partici-
pation - was an important prerequisite for stability in early modern
Europe, and consequently, that republics were more successful at
providing this stability.'! The chapters by Wiirgler and Prak are two
more voices added to this chorus.
PART III The legitimacy of these types of solutions was certainly a
challenge in its own right. The republic was, in some sense, a form of
anti-government, defined by what it was not - a monarchy - rather
than by what it was and listing its own virtues. Political science lec-
tures at the University of Leiden in the first half of the seventeenth
century typically praised the monarchy as a superior form of govern-
ment, without ever referring to the Dutch Republic's own unique
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agreed upon on the 'national' level in the Confederation. But while
the principle of 'cuius regia, eius religio' suited the autonomous can-
tons with their subject territories that totally subscribed to the pre-
modern ideal of religious unity, it did not appeal to the joint domin-
ions where Catholics and Protestants lived together and were gov-
erned by bailiffs of the various creeds. To maintain a religious coexis-
tence, various kinds of intermediate solutions were sought, devel-
oped and then tolerated. The most spectacular example is the simul-
taneum, which was practised in several parishes, and meant that two
opposing creeds ended up sharing the same church building.P Loetz
also points out that the two confessions copied certain outward as-
pects of one another and thus actually came to resemble each other
more than the verbal conflicts might suggest.
Loetz proposes that we start thinking in terms of a 'deconfession-
alised confessionalisation', a proposal which is further echoed, and
indeed amplified, in Willem Frijhoff's contribution. Frijhoff de-
scribes how Dutch revolutionaries, during the 1570S and 1580s, in-
troduced Calvinism as the new official creed in the newly independ-
ent Dutch Republic. But while the Dutch Reformed Church received
all kinds of privileges, its room for manoeuvre was also carefully cir-
cumscribed by those same revolutionary leaders. Private religious be-
liefs were permitted, non-Calvinists, albeit formally illegal, were al-
lowed to continue their own forms of worship. The degree of tolera-
tion, of course, depended on local circumstances. Religious unity
was promoted in the Dutch Republic via a civic form of religion that
emphasised common Christian values and downplayed the differ-
ences between the churches. Both of these chapters demonstrate how,
in their own unique ways, the Swiss and Dutch political elites stead-
fastly refused to allow religious conflicts to threaten the political uni-
ty and stability they considered the very foundation of the republican
regime and hence their own legitimacy as the republic's governing
representatives.
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form of government."? At the only Swiss university, in Basel, the
study of imperial law - i.e. the law of a (universal) monarchy - re-
mained the basic course of study until the late seventeenth century,
with academic discussion regarding Swiss public law only commenc-
ing in the eighteenth century.18 This meant that the Swiss Confedera-
tion and the Dutch Republic - both officially part of the Empire, at
least until the Westphalian Peace settlement of 1648 - had to develop
and adapt their own political theories and self-descriptions in re-
sponse to the standard monarchical presuppositions of universal or-
der and the more demanding exigencies of public law and interna-
tionallaw as developed by Jean Bodin, Hugo Grotius, and their suc-
cessors. Thomas Maissen and Martin van Gelderen discuss aspects
of this process in their respective chapters, while Olaf Morke com-
pares the way the two republics represented themselves. Switzerland
somehow managed to co-exist quite comfortably with the imperial
structures until the seventeenth century - the idea of Empire and con-
crete imperial privileges provided legitimacy for the governments in
the individual cantons. There was little internal necessity for them to
refer to the concept of sovereignty. However, the French provided the
Swiss with the ideas that alienated them from the concept of Empire.
The new concept of a (sovereign) republic, based on Dutch models of
representation, established the Confederation as a (minor) member
of the European community of states, but it was also welcomed by
the larger Swiss cantons because it introduced 'republican abso-
lutism', which abolished the traditional privileges of the common cit-
izens and helped consolidate a hereditary elite.
Religious unity within the cantons remained quintessential in this
republican interpretation of absolutism. However, the Dutch did not
follow this path, even though since the beginning of their revolt, the
confederate constitution had stimulated discussions about possibly
adopting the Swiss cantonal system, and although the Dutch seemed
to lack some of the Swiss military virtues. Martin van Gelderen's
chapter points out that Justus Lipsius represents the same conven-
tional (Swiss)notion of religious unity as indispensable for the avoid-
ance of political discord. Meanwhile, Dirck Volckertsz Coornhert
considered tolerance to be the foundation of concord. Here Coorn-
hert followed Hugo Grotius's Erasmianism and Irenicism. Grotius
advocated state control over a public church thereby limiting its dog-
ma to an absolute minimum, thus avoiding discord on religious
grounds. Historiography would take the place of theology as the ide-
PART IV Political theory and historiographywere sources of inspira-
tion for how artists represented the Swiss and Dutch republics that
had to cope with the insecurity of theoretical legitimacy in an often
unfriendly international environment. The importance of art during
the Dutch Republic's Golden Age is so obvious that it raises ques-
tions about the possibility of 'republican art'. These issues are dis-
cussed by Michael North and William Eisler. North wonders
whether there is any real difference between the production and con-
sumption of the (visual) arts in a republic and in a monarchy. The
production of crafts played a role in both countries, but was more de-
cisive in the United Provinces because the quantity and quality of the
demand was more dynamic there. As North demonstrates, landscape
paintings became really popular in both countries, developing into
an export product for painters in both the Dutch Republic and
Switzerland. This pictorial celebration of the geography of one's
country seems at first sight to be merely a realistic photographic ren-
dering, but was actually imbued with moral suggestions about life
and society."? The motives and public use of art in the two republics
is the source of more similarities, as William Eisler's chapter shows.
ological foundation of society. Grotius's Liber de Antiquitate
Reipublicae Batavorum, provided an essential contribution to the
Dutch republic's founding myths, which included the Humanist ex-
trapolation of 'free' ancient ancestors. Swiss humanists had likewise
discovered the origins of their nation in the Helvetians. These Bata-
vians and Helvetians would, in the Revolutionary Era of the late eigh-
teenth century, suggest the names of the new 'Batavian' and 'Hel-
vetian'republics.
Medieval history played a more significant role than antiquity for
the Swiss, however, and especially with regard to such concepts as
concordia, pax and libertas. Olaf Morke suggests that the more static
Dutch myths tended to neglect the republic's - obvious - inner con-
flicts while the Swiss remained conscious of the dangers and internal
tensi~ns by dynamically applying historical examples. The glorious
past referred to the entire federation for both nations, but local his-
torical references seemed to have been more common in the Dutch
towns. Meanwhile, in sixteenth-century Switzerland references to
the Confederation in town halls only began to give way in the late
seventeenth century to an iconography that focussed on single can-
tons as sovereign republics.
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Interestingly, the Dassier medal workshop in Geneva offered its
medals to the princes of Orange in the same way that they offered
them to monarchs. The King of France would, however, have been
uncomfortable with the history of the Roman republic, produced on
a series of medals for the stadholder, with whose self-image it res-
onated much better. The Dassier medals often used motifs borrowed
directly from Dutch political history, which expressed reconciliation
and concord within the republic.
PART v The exchange of visual motifs was one of many political,
cultural and economic interactions between the two republics. In the
sixteenth century, many Dutchmen studied at the Calvinist academy
in Geneva, while in the seventeenth century, the flow of students
turned around, when approximately 700 reformed Swiss students
came to the Netherlands - especially Leiden - to further their studies.
Moreover, Swiss regiments had served in the Dutch army since the
1690s, first in a series of wars against France, and until the nine-
teenth century fairly often in the Dutch colonies. The relationship
was one-sided because the Dutch Republic had evolved into one of
the world's great powers during the course of the seventeenth centu-
ry and therefore required lots of soldiers. This imbalance created
some awkward exchanges, as is evident in the efforts of Francois
Louis de Pesmes de Saint-Saphorin from Berne who participated in
the negotiations for the Peace of Utrecht in 1713. Stefan Altorfer-
Ong, in his chapter, notes that one of Saint-Saphorin's objectives was
the defensive military alliance of 1712. Money also came into the
equation when Holland received a considerable loan from the mythi-
cal Bernese treasury. Saint-Saphorin ultimately tried to throw into
the bargain a group of Anabaptists that the Bernese authorities tried
to get rid of, which became a delicate issue because the tolerant
Dutch disagreed with the harsh treatment the Bernese meted out to
dissenters. The Dutch eventually turned the issue into a universal ar-
gument for the freedom of conscience. The fate of the Mennonites
suggests how the Dutch and the Swiss had quite different ideas when
it came to republican virtues. While the commercial and peace-ori-
ented Dutch were constantly threatened by wars, civic and military
Berne could develop peacefully and at the same time export war
through its mercenaries.
This problem of squaring a political regime with economic expedi-
ency was passionately discussed in the eighteenth century by numer-
ous contemporaries, like Walter Harte and Montesquieu, whose
ideas are analysed in Ida Nijenhuis's chapter. What type of economy
was best suited for a republic? Some insisted that it had to be one
based on commerce, and pointed to notable examples like Venice and
the Dutch Republic. Others insisted it was one based on agriculture
because they looked at the Swiss, or Ancient Rome, for that matter.
The argument for commerce seemed the most compelling, as the
Dutch did so extremely well in the seventeenth century. The argu-
ment for agriculture made a comeback in the eighteenth century be-
cause Dutch trade had fallen on hard times, while the agricultural
Swiss were suddenly doing well. But the economy was just one aspect
of the d~bate. There was also the underlying issue of national autono-
my: could a country afford to rely on substantial food imports? Sud-
denly the Swiss began to look more prudent, and the Dutch were por-
trayed as too dependent on the volatile forces of chance. New ideas
about luxury further cast this debate into yet another light.
The Swiss reformers during the Enlightenment also participated in
these international debates. They wavered between autonomy and
autarky, and the necessity of integrating the Confederation into the
emerging world economy. Bela Kapossy, in his chapter, demonstrates
that the Dutch played an ambiguous role. On the one hand, their
Golden Age conjured up a myriad of opportunities for prosperity and
freedom. Swiss intellectuals found the notion that tolerance could
produce civic peace among religiously different sectors of the popu-
lation particularly attractive, and that this form of civic peace seemed
to provide the ideal springboard for further economic growth. In oth-
er words, the Dutch demonstrated, that contrary to the received wis-
dom of the time, civic peace imposed by government coercion was
not a prerequisite for social stability. Instead, the Swiss and Dutch
social models of pluriformity were potentially as powerful and suc-
cessful as any dynastic state. On the other hand, Holland's decline
during the eighteenth century suggested that prosperity could also
easily lead to corruption, and that corruption, in turn, could lead to
economic decline and social disintegration. More alarmingly, Hol-
land's problems in the eighteenth century were not the result of some
freak accident of history, but the inevitable outcome of the volatile
nature of commerce itself. Holland's dependence on trade had made
the country wealthy, but also led to its decline. It is no wonder then
that Swiss reformers sought a formula that would provide the bene-
fits of the Dutch model, but spare them its disadvantages.
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A comparison of the early modern Netherlands and Switzerland, as
we have seen, does not produce a clear-cut opposition between the re-
publican and monarchical models. The reality is much more ambigu-
ous. The constitutional structures of the two countries both stemmed
from the medieval Empire. The two treaties of Munster from I648,
which constituted the formalisation of their sovereignty according to
international law, could even be interpreted as two exemptions with-
in the Empire and the realm of imperial law at that time. Of course,
the fact is that the princely power of the Habsburgs was either abol-
ished (in Switzerland), or at least severely limited and eventually
handed over to a 'native' dynasty, the house of Orange (in the
Netherlands). But there were few new 'republican' institutions. Fed-
eral structures were essentially traditional solutions that allowed
city-states and, in the Swiss case, even rural communities to maintain
a high level of autonomy according to the rules of the Empire, but at
its periphery, where the Emperors and princes could not actually im-
pose their powers. The price for this autonomy (and later their sover-
eignty) was an inevitable loss in military and political efficiency. The
Dutch solution of establishing the stadholder can be seen as semi-
monarchic, leading to a strong patronage network and actually
preparing for the formal enthronement of the House of Orange in the
nineteenth century. 21
The strategic position as a neutral buffer between Habsburg and
Bourbon Empires allowed the Swiss to avoid having to install a stad-
holder-like commander-in-chief. This would probably have been in-
evitable in a case involving prolonged warfare with one of its neigh-
bouring monarchies.
The Swiss and Dutch republics realised that the federal model was
the only structure that was able to cope with the many internal diver-
sities among the small autonomous units. But it was also an accom-
plishment of the republican model as such, to guarantee integration
and the participation of great numbers of citizens in the public weal,
and stabilise complex religious arrangements. By fostering internal
competition and differentiation, the republics adapted quite well to
changing economic and social environments. In the eighteenth cen-
tury, the Dutch commercial republic and - despite its predominantly
urban and proto-industrial wealth - the agrarian Swiss republic
could emerge as models for economically successful and liberal con-
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VI The more an idealised 'republicanism' became the model
other countries in Europe, the more the existing republics had to
the need for reform. Montesquieu belonged to a growing num-
ber of enlightened authors who were seeking constitutional solutions
that would avoid both the risk of an absolutist king's arbitrary rule,
and the inefficiencies and irrationality that riddled the republics that
were governed by increasingly small and selfish elites. The city-states
that once played a crucial role in the development of the republican
state, and in the emergence of the Dutch and Swiss federations, was
not an apt model for larger nations like France. The English 'mixed
constitution' was as much a challenge for monarchies as it was for
the free states, where members of the few ruling families decided on
legislation and jurisdiction without the aid of written laws and with-
out any notion of the separation of powers. Venice, the Netherlands
and eventually even Switzerland - though cherished by many Ger-
man philo-helvetists - not only became less appealing as political
models, but also had to develop new coping mechanisms for the in-
creased demand for political participation.
Geneva in particular became a kind of laboratory for revolutionary
movements in the eighteenth century. However 'patriots' appeared
almost everywhere to insist on the structural changes necessary for
the strengthening of the old republics against both foreign aggression
and internal strife. As Marc Lerner's chapter points out, these repub-
lican patriots were quite in the vanguard of European radicalism in
the late eighteenth century. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's ideas, heavily
influenced by his experience as a citizen of Geneva with its long
struggle against the town's patriciate, speak volumes. The Dutch Pa-
triots also made their impact well before I 789. Both Swiss and Dutch
radicals could be - and in fact have been - mistaken for traditional-
ists, who couched their proposals in a discourse that hearkened back
to earlier times. Lerner points out that in one sense, both republics
had constitutions that offered their citizens much of what the French
revolutionaries were clamouring for. It is probably no coincidence
that the slogan 'liberte, [raternite, egalite'was a Dutch, rather than a
French concept. However, while genuine democracy required a cer-
tain degree of centralisation, simply to destroy the numerous inter-
vening institutions that prevented political equality, it proved ex-
tremely difficult to push through these democratic reforms precisely
because of the embedded nature of citizenship in both the Swiss and
the Dutch constitutions.20
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